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Secure Switch-and-Stay Combining (SSSC) for
Cognitive Relay Networks
Lisheng Fan, Shengli Zhang, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and George K. Karagiannidis, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we study a two-phase underlay cog-
nitive relay network, where there exists an eavesdropper who
can overhear the message. The secure data transmission from
the secondary source to secondary destination is assisted by
two decode-and-forward (DF) relays. Although the traditional
opportunistic relaying technique can choose one relay to provide
the best secure performance, it needs to continuously have the
channel state information (CSI) of both relays, and may result
in a high relay switching rate. To overcome these limitations, a
secure switch-and-stay combining (SSSC) protocol is proposed
where only one out of the two relays is activated to assist the
secure data transmission, and the secure relay switching occurs
when the relay cannot support the secure communication any
longer. This security switching is assisted by either instantaneous
or statistical eavesdropping CSI. For these two cases, we study
the system secure performance of SSSC protocol, by deriving
the analytical secrecy outage probability as well as an asymptotic
expression for the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) region.
We show that SSSC can substantially reduce the system com-
plexity while achieving or approaching the full diversity order
of opportunistic relaying in the presence of the instantaneous or
statistical eavesdropping CSI.
Index Terms—Secure switch-and-stay combining (SSSC), cog-
nitive relay networks, secure communication, diversity order.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature, the wireless link from the
source to destination may be overheard by some non-intended
eavesdroppers, which causes the severe issue of wireless
security. To prevent the wiretap, physical-layer security (PLS)
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as well as high-layer security has been proposed and exten-
sively studied in the literature [1]–[5]. In this field, Wyner
firstly introduced the wiretap model to analyze the secure
transmission [1], and pointed out that perfect secrecy can
be achieved with properly designed encoder and decoder.
Pioneered by this work, many researchers have extensively
analyzed the PLS performance in fading channels. In [2],
the authors studied the secure transmission by analyzing the
secrecy capacity with full or partial channel state information
(CSI), and demonstrated that the channel fading has a positive
impact on the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, the authors in
[3] studied the secure performance over correlated fading
channels, by analyzing the secrecy capacity and secrecy outage
probability (SOP), and showed that the channel correlation
severely degrades the secure transmission. To enhance the
system security, antenna selection can be applied for multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, where the
channel fluctuation among antennas can be exploited to obtain
the full system diversity gain.
As relaying techniques [6]–[9] can increase the transmission
reliability, system capacity, and coverage area without addi-
tional transmit power at the transmitter, the secure transmission
in relay networks has attracted much attention in recent works.
There are two fundamental relaying protocols, i.e., amplify-
and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) relaying. The
intercept probability of multiple AF relay networks has been
studied in [10], and the opportunistic relaying technique is
used to exploit the full diversity gain for enhancing the
security. As an extension of intercept probability, the SOP
is studied for multiuser multiple AF relay networks in [11],
where several users and relay selection schemes are proposed
to enhance the system security. In addition, the asymptotic
secure performance is investigated with the high main-to-
eavesdropper ratio (MER), defined as the ratio of average
channel gain from the relay to intended receiver to that from
relay to eavesdropper. The secure characteristics of the DF
relay network has been studied in [12], and it is found that
the placement of the DF relay can also affect the system secure
metrics, such as secrecy capacity and SOP. For multiuser DF
relay networks [13], opportunistic relaying can be used to
exploit the channel fluctuation among relays, and hence the
full diversity of wireless system can be achieved. To further
enhance the network security, the other techniques such as
jamming, beamforming and resource allocation have been
investigated for relay networks [14]–[24].
Due to the scarce radio frequency spectrum, the cognitive
technique [25] is encouraged to be incorporated into relay
networks to form a promising system for the next generation
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of wireless communications networks. Hence, the PLS of cog-
nitive relay networks should be studied to guarantee the secure
transmission. Various resource allocation strategies have been
proposed to enhance the system security of cognitive relay
networks. Specifically, power allocation can be applied to
optimize the total transmit power among network nodes to
improve the transmission security [26], [27]. For cognitive
relay networks with multiple relays, opportunistic relaying can
be used to choose the best relay to assist the secure trans-
mission [28]–[30]. Although the opportunistic relaying can
efficiently exploit the full system diversity, it has two major
limitations [31]–[38]. The first limitation is the heavy load
due to the system’s needs to estimate the channel parameters
of each relay continuously. The second limitation is the high
relay switching rate, which is harmful to the network stability.
Therefore, it is of vital importance to overcome these two
limitations to ensure the security of the network.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussion, in this paper,
we propose a secure switching-and-stay combining (SSSC)
protocol for the cognitive relay networks with two DF relays,
in the presence of an eavesdropper. In SSSC, one relay out
of two is chosen to be activated to assist the secure data
transmission for the secondary source to secondary destination.
The relay switching occurs if the relay cannot support the
secure transmission any longer; otherwise, the same relay
continues to be used. The secure relay switching is assisted
by the instantaneous eavesdropping CSI (I-ECSI) or statis-
tical eavesdropping CSI (S-ECSI). In comparison with the
conventional opportunistic relaying for secure cognitive relay
networks [28]–[30], SSSC can reduce the channel estimation
complexity, decrease the relay switching rate, and simultane-
ously maintain the secure performance. The key contributions
of this paper are summarized as follow:
• We propose the SSSC protocol for the cognitive relay
networks, in order to reduce the channel estimation com-
plexity, keep the network stability, and simultaneously
maintain the secure performance.
• For the SSSC with either I-ECSI or S-ECSI, we present
an analytical expression for the system secrecy outage
probability, in order to investigate the secure performance
achieved by SSSC.
• We present new results for the asymptotic secrecy out-
age probability of SSSC. These asymptotic expressions
enable us to determine the major factors that regulate the
secure performance in the high transmit power and MER
regions.
• Based on the asymptotic results, it is shown that SSSC
with instantaneous eavesdropping CSI can achieve the
system full diversity, and SSSC with statistical eavesdrop-
ping CSI can also approach this diversity.
The organization of this paper is as follows. After the
introduction, Section II describes the model of a secure
cognitive relay network with two DF relays, and Section III
presents the SSSC protocol. For SSSC with either I-ECSI or
S-ECSI, Section IV gives the secrecy outage probabilities,
including the derivations for both the exact and asymptotic
results. Numerical results are provided in Section V to offer
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Fig. 1. Secure communication of two-phase underlay cognitive relay
networks with two DF relays.
valuable insights into the secure performance. Conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
Notation: The notation CN (0, σ2) denotes a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean
and variance σ2. We use fX(·) to represent the probability
density function of random variable X . Notation Pr[·] returns
the probability.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 depicts the considered two-phase underlay cognitive
relay network with two DF relays {Ri|i = 1, 2} which can
assist the communication from the secondary source S to the
secondary destination D. In the underlay spectrum-sharing
mode, the transmit power of both the secondary user and relays
is constrained to limit the interference to the primary user
PU , in order to guarantee the Quality-of-Service (QoS) of
primary communications. The eavesdropper E in the network
can overhear the message from the relays, which yields the
issue of information wiretap. We consider severe shadowing
environments, so that the direct links from the source S to D
and E do not exist. While it is interesting to consider moderate
shadowing environments and study the impact of direct links
on the secure performance [14], [39], this is beyond the scope
of this work. The considered system model in Fig. 1 can
be applied to the communication of cognitive relay networks
in unsecure environments, where the secondary information
transmission may be wiretapped.
To provide the best secure performance, opportunistic re-
laying technique can be used to choose one relay out of two.
However, opportunistic relaying needs continuous channel
estimation, which leads to an increase in system complexity
and may result in a high relay switching rate. To resolve these
issues, the proposed SSSC protocol will be used, where one
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relay is activated while the other is silent1. Before presenting
the SSSC protocol, we first detail the two-phase data trans-
mission process, as follows.
Assume that the relay Ri (i = 1, or 2) is activated, while
the other relay Rj (j 6= i) is silent. All nodes in the network
are equipped with a single antenna due to the size limitation,
and operate in a time-division half-duplex mode. Moreover,
all the links in the network experience independent Rayleigh
fading. In the first phase, the secondary user S transmits its
signal xS of unit-variance, and Ri receives yRi as
yRi =
√
PShS,RixS + nRi , (1)
where hS,Ri ∼ CN (0, αi) is the instantaneous channel param-
eter of the S–Ri link and nRi ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay Ri. We denote PS
as the transmit power of S, and to guarantee the quality of
primary communication, it is limited by
PS =
IP
|hS,PU |2
, (2)
where IP is the maximum interference level and hS,PU ∼
CN (0, η0) is the instantaneous channel parameter of the S-
PU link. From (1)-(2), the received SNR at Ri is given by
SNRRi = I˜P
ui
t0
, (3)
where ui = |hS,Ri|2 and t0 = |hS,PU |2 are the associated
channel gains of the S–Ri and S–PU links, respectively, and
I˜P = IP /σ
2 is the maximum interference level-to-noise ratio.
Suppose that Ri can correctly decode the message from the
source with data rate Rd being constrained by
1
2
log2(1 + SNRRi) ≥ Rd, (4)
which is equivalent to SNRRi ≥ γ0, with γ0 = 22Rd − 1
being a given SNR threshold. In this case, Ri forwards the
correctly decoded signal, and the received signals at D and E
are respectively given by
yD =
√
PRihRi,DxS + nD, (5)
yE =
√
PRihRi,ExS + nE , (6)
where hRi,D ∼ CN (0, βi), hRi,E ∼ CN (0, εi) are the
instantaneous channel parameters of Ri–D and Ri–E links,
respectively, while nD ∼ CN (0, σ2) and nE ∼ CN (0, σ2) are
the AWGNs at D and E, respectively. In addition, PRi is the
transmit power of relay Ri, which is limited by
PRi =
IP
|hRi,PU |
2
, (7)
to guarantee the QoS of primary communications, where
hRi,PU ∼ CN (0, ηi) is the instantaneous channel parameter
1Note that the main purpose of this work is to reduce the implementation
complexity of the secure relay networks and simultaneously maintain the
secure performance. Although the other relay can use the cooperative jamming
to enhance the system security, it will cause an increase in the implementation
complexity, such as synchronization and message exchange between the
network nodes [14]–[16]. Hence jamming technique is not considered in this
work.
of the Ri–PU link. From (5)-(7), the received SNRs at D and
E are written respectively as
SNRD = I˜P
vi
ti
, (8)
SNRE = I˜P
wi
ti
, (9)
where vi = |hRi,D|2, wi = |hRi,E |2 and ti = |hRi,PU |2 are
the associated channel gains.
Given a predetermined secure data rate Rs, the system
secure transmission will be in outage if
1
2
log2(1 + SNRD)−
1
2
log2(1 + SNRE) < Rs. (10)
From (10), we can find that the received SNR at eavesdropper
E should not exceed the SNR at D to obtain a non-zero
secrecy rate. This constraint is different from that at the
primary user, and hence the eavesdropper cannot be assumed
as another primary user. After some manipulations, (10) can
be further written as
1 + I˜P
vi
ti
1 + I˜P
wi
ti
< γs, (11)
where γs = 22Rs is the secrecy threshold.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE SSSC PROTOCOL
Before the data transmission, the system needs to deter-
mine which relay to be activated for assisting the secure
transmission. Suppose that the relay Ri (i = 1, or 2) was
used in the previous data transmission. Then at the beginning
of the current data transmission, the system first estimates
the channel parameters of the links with Ri from the help
of pilot signals. Then Ri gathers all the channel parameters
through some dedicated feedback channels. Specifically, the
secondaryRi can gather the channel parameters of interference
links from the primary user by using several techniques,
e.g., direct feedback from PU, indirect feedback from band
manager. More details about acquiring the channel information
of interference links can be found in [40]–[43]. As to the
channel parameters of eavesdropper links, the secondary Ri
can obtain these parameters through some feedback when the
eavesdropper is active, e.g., the eavesdropper is another active
user in the network. On the other hand, when the eavesdropper
is passive, Ri can still obtain the statistical information of
eavesdropper links, by some ways, such as estimating the
eavesdropper’s location in the network. More details about
acquiring the channel information of eavesdropper links can
be found in [11], [44].
After obtaining the required channel information, SSSC will
use the same relay Ri for the current data transmission when
Ri can correctly decode the message from the source and more
importantly, it can guarantee a secure transmission as
1 + I˜P
vi
ti
1 + I˜P
wi
ti
≥ T, (12)
where T is a given secure switching threshold. Otherwise, if
Ri cannot correctly decode the message or fails to guarantee
the secure transmission as described by (12), a relay switching
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Pout = p1 Pr
[
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+p1Pr
[
I˜P
u1
t0
< γ0||
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< T, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
+ p2 Pr
[
I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
≥ T,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3
+p2 Pr
[
I˜P
u2
t0
< γ0||
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< T, I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J4
,
(14)
occurs, which is notified to the other nodes in the network
through a dedicated feedback channel. Then, the other relay Rj
will be activated, and the system needs to estimate the channel
parameters of main and interference links with Rj , with the
help of pilot signals. After that, the current data transmission
starts through the help of Rj .
Note that in (12), the relay Ri needs to know the instan-
taneous CSI of the eavesdropper link, in order to determine
whether the secure relay switching occurs or not. In some
communication scenarios, the instantaneous CSI of eavesdrop-
per link is however hard to obtain, and only its statistical
information may be known. In this case, the secure relay
switching metric in (12) becomes
1 + I˜P
vi
ti
1 + I˜P
E{wi}
ti
≥ T, (13)
where E{·} denotes the statistical expectation. If the above
equation holds and Ri can correctly decode the message, the
same relay Ri will continue to be used for the current data
transmission. Otherwise, the secure relay switching occurs and
the other relay Rj will be activated to assist the current data
transmission.
From (12) and (13), we can conclude that the relay switch-
ing of SSSC depends not only on the transmission quality of
main links, but also on whether the relay can support a secure
transmission or not. In contrast, the relay switching of SSC in
non-secure networks [31]–[38] depends only on the transmis-
sion quality of main links. As such, the switching mechanism
of SSSC is much more complicated than that of SSC in non-
secure networks. More importantly, the mathematical analysis
of the system performance becomes much more complex. In
the following section, we study the secure performance of the
SSSC protocol by analyzing SOP in the two cases of I-ECSI
and S-ECSI.
IV. SECURE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Analytical SOP with I-ECSI
For a secure transmission system, the system SOP is defined
as the probability that the difference in data rate between the
main link and eavesdropper link drops below a predetermined
data rate. From this definition and (10)-(11), we can write
the SOP of SSSC with I-ECSI in (14) at the top of this page,
where the notation || denotes the logical OR operation. p1 and
p2 are the probabilities that the relay R1 and R2 are activated,
respectively. Note that J1 and J3 represent the SOP when R1
and R2 continue to be used for the current data transmission,
respectively, while J2 and J4 correspond to the SOP when
the relay switching occurs from R1 to R2, and vice versa,
respectively. Also p1 and p2 are given by
p1 =
c1
c1 + c2
, (15)
p2 =
c2
c1 + c2
, (16)
where
c1 = Pr
[
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T
]
, (17)
c2 = Pr
[
I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
≥ T
]
, (18)
correspond to the probabilities that R1 and R2 continue to be
used for the current data transmission, respectively. Note that
the two relay branches share the common random variable of
t0 related to the transmit power PS at the secondary source,
when the secure relay switching occurs in J2 and J4. This
causes the data transmission of both branches to be correlated
and makes the mathematical analysis more complicated.
To solve this mathematical troublesome, we present the
analytical expressions of c1, J1 and J2 in the following
proposition,
Proposition 1: An analytical expression of c1 is given by
c1 = L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)L
( (T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(
Tε1
β1
), (19)
where L(x) = (1+x)−1 and (19) is obtained by applying the
probability density functions of fu1(x) = 1α1 e
− x
α1 , ft0(x) =
1
η0
e−
x
η0 , ft1(x) =
1
η1
e−
x
η1 , fv1(x) =
1
β1
e−
x
β1 and fw1(x) =
1
ε1
e
− x
ε1 [45]. The analytical expressions of J1 and J2 are given
by
J1 =


L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)
[
L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(
Tε1
β1
)
−L
(
(γs−1)η1
I˜P β1
)
L(γsε1
β1
)
]
, If T < γs
0, If T ≥ γs
.
(20)
J2 =
[
1− L
((γs − 1)η2
I˜Pβ2
)
L(
γsε2
β2
)
][
L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα2
)
− L
(
(
1
α1
+
1
α2
)
γ0η0
I˜P
)
L
((T − 1η1)
I˜Pβ1
)
L(
Tε1
β1
)
]
. (21)
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Pout = p˜1 Pr
[
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜PE{w1}
≥ T,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J˜1
+p˜1Pr
[
I˜P
u1
t0
< γ0||
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜PE{w1}
< T, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< γs︸ ︷︷˜
J2
+ p˜2 Pr
[
I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜PE{w2}
≥ T,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< γs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J˜3
+p˜2 Pr
[
I˜P
u2
t0
< γ0||
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜PE{w2}
< T, I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs︸ ︷︷˜
J4
(22)
θ =


[
L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
− L(
γsε1
β1
)L
( (γs − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)]
e−q0 + L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(−q1γsε1)
×
(
e−
Tε1
β1
−q1Tε1 − e−q0
)
− L
(
(γs−1)η1
I˜P β1
)
L
(
( γs
β1
− q2γs)ε1
)(
e−q2Tε1 − e−q0
)
If T < γs
L
((T − γs)η1
I˜P ε1γs
+
(T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)(
1− L(
γsε1
β1
)
)
e−q0 , If T ≥ γs
. (30)
By replacing α1, β1, η1 and ε1 by α2, β2, η2 and ε2 respec-
tively, we can obtain the analytical expression of c2 from the
expression of c1 in Proposition 1. This leads to the analytical
expressions of p1 and p2. Similarly, by swapping α1 with
α2, β1 with β2, and η1 with η2, we can obtain the analytical
expressions of J3 and J4 from the expressions of J1 and J2 in
Proposition 1. In this way, we arrive at the analytical expres-
sion of SOP with I-ECSI as Pout = p1(J1+J2)+p2(J3+J4).
B. Analytical SOP with S-ECSI
According to the definition of SOP, we can write the SOP of
SSSC with S-ECSI in (22) at the top of the next page, where
J˜1 and J˜3 represent the SOP when R1 and R2 continue to
be used for the current data transmission, respectively, while
J˜2 and J˜4 correspond to the SOP when the relay switching
occurs from R1 to R2, and that from R2 to R1, respectively.
Also, p˜1 and p˜2 are given by
p˜1 =
c˜1
c˜1 + c˜2
, (23)
p˜2 =
c˜2
c˜1 + c˜2
, (24)
where
c˜1 = Pr
[
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜PE{w1}
≥ T
]
, (25)
c˜2 = Pr
[
I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0,
t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜PE{w2}
≥ T
]
, (26)
correspond to the probabilities that R1 and R2 continue to be
used for the current data transmission, respectively. Similar to
the analysis of J2 and J4, the two relay branches share the
common random variable of t0, when the secure relay switch-
ing occurs in J˜2 and J˜4. This makes the data transmission
of both branches correlated, and the mathematical analysis
becomes more complicated. Moreover, the secure switching
metric t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜PE{w1}
is highly correlated with the outage metric
t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜Pw1
, but not the same. This correlation will also cause
much difficulty to the mathematical analysis.
To resolve the complicated mathematical analysis, we give
the analytical expressions of c˜1, J˜1 and J˜2 in the following
proposition,
Proposition 2: The analytical expression of c˜1 is given by
c˜1 = L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)L
( (T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
e−
ε1T
β1 . (27)
The analytical expressions of J˜1 and J˜2 are given by
J˜1 = L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)θ, (28)
J˜2 =
[
1− L
((γs − 1)η2
I˜Pβ2
)
L(
γsε2
β2
)
][
L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα2
)
− L
(
(
1
α1
+
1
α2
)
γ0η0
I˜P
)
L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
e−
Tε1
β1
]
, (29)
where θ is given by (30) at the top of this page, and

q0 =
T
γs
+
Tε1
β1
q1 = (
1
η1
+
T − 1
I˜Pβ1
)
I˜P
γs − T
q2 = (
1
η1
+
γs − 1
I˜Pβ1
)
I˜P
γs − T
. (31)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Similarly, by replacing α1 by α2, β1 with β2, and η1 with
η2, we can obtain the analytical expression of c˜2 from the
expression of c˜1 in Proposition 2. This leads to the analytical
expressions of p˜1 and p˜2. By swapping α1 with α2, β1 with
β2, and η1 with η2, we can obtain the analytical expressions
of J˜3 and J˜4 from the expressions of J˜1 and J˜2 in Proposition
2. In this way, we arrive at the analytical expression of SOP
with S-ECSI as Pout = p˜1(J˜1 + J˜2) + p˜2(J˜3 + J˜4).
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C. Asymptotic SOP with I-ECSI
To obtain additional insights on the system performance,
we now extend to analyze the asymptotic SOP performance
of SSSC with I-ECSI, in high transmit power and high MER
regions, where MER is defined as the ratio of average channel
gain from the relay to intended receiver to that from relay to
eavesdropper [11]. The asymptotic SOP with I-ECSI is given
by the following proposition,
Proposition 3: The asymptotic c1 and c2 with high transmit
power and high MER can be approximated from [36, eq.
(1.112)] as
c1 ≃ 1, c2 ≃ 1. (32)
We further write the asymptotic SOP of SSSC with I-ECSI in
high transmit power and high MER region as
Pout ≃


ε1 + ε2
2λ1λ2
+
γs − T
2
(1 + ζ1
λ1
+
1 + ζ2
λ2
)
, If T < γs
ε1 + ε2
2λ1λ2
, If T ≥ γs
,
(33)
where

ζ1 =
ρ1η1
β1
, ζ2 =
ρ2η2
β2
ρ1 =
λ1
I˜P
, ρ2 =
λ2
I˜P
ε1 = [γs + (γs − 1)ζ2] · [T + (T − 1)ζ1 + γ0η0ρ1/α1]
ε2 = [γs + (γs − 1)ζ1] · [T + (T − 1)ζ2 + γ0η0ρ2/α2]
.
(34)
Proof: See Appendix C.
In particular, when the transmit power is much larger than
MER with I˜P ≫ λi (i = 1, 2), ρi approaches to zero, causing
that ζi ≃ 0 and εi ≃ 0. In this case, we can simplify the
asymptotic SOP in (33) as
Pout ≃


Tγs
λ1λ2
+
γs − T
2
( 1
λ1
+
1
λ2
)
, If T < γs
Tγs
λ1λ2
, If T ≥ γs
. (35)
From the above asymptotic expressions, we can get the fol-
lowing insights on the system:
Remark 1: In high I˜P and MER region, both c1 and c2
approach to one, indicating that the same relay will continue
to be used for a long time. Hence, the system only needs
to estimate the channel parameters with a single relay. This
can substantially reduce the implementation complexity in
practice.
Remark 2: When T ≥ γs, the system can achieve the full
diversity order of two, as a large value of T can guarantee
an effective secure relay switching. On the other hand, when
T < γs, the system diversity order falls into [1, 2), indicating
that too small a value of T cannot effectively exploit the two
relays to guarantee the secure transmission.
Remark 3: The optimal value of the secure switching threshold
T ∗ is equal to the system secrecy threshold γs.
D. Asymptotic SOP with S-ECSI
To obtain some insights on the system of SSSC protocol
with S-ECSI, we now derive the asymptotic SOP with large
I˜P and MER, in the following proposition,
Proposition 4: The asymptotic c˜1 and c˜2 with large I˜P and
MER can be written from [36, eq. (1.112)] as
c˜1 ≃ 1, c˜2 ≃ 1. (36)
Then we approximate the SOP of SSSC with S-ECSI in high
I˜P and high MER regions as
Pout ≃


ε1 + ε2
2λ1λ2
+
γs
2
e−
T
γs
[1− ε23e− Tγs 1−ε3ε3
(1− ε3)λ1
+
1− ε24e
− T
γs
1−ε4
ε4
(1− ε4)λ2
]
, If T < γs
ε1 + ε2
2λ1λ2
+
γs
2
e−
T
γs
( 1
(1− ε3)λ1
+
1
(1− ε4)λ2
)
, If T ≥ γs
,
(37)
with {
ε3 = (γs − T )ζ1/γs
ε4 = (γs − T )ζ2/γs
. (38)
Proof: See Appendix D.
In particular, when the transmit power is much larger than
the value of MER with I˜P ≫ λi (i = 1, 2), both ε3 and
ε4 approach to zero due to ζi ≃ 0. In this condition, the
asymptotic SOP of SSSC with S-ECSI is simplified as
Pout ≃
γsT
λ1λ2
+
γs
2
( 1
λ1
+
1
λ2
)
e−
T
γs . (39)
By setting the derivative of above Pout with respect to T into
zero, we can readily obtain the minimum Pout as
Pout,min =
γ2s
λ1λ2
(
1 + ln
λ1 + λ2
2γs
)
. (40)
From these asymptotic results, we can achieve the following
insights on the system performance with S-ECSI:
Remark 1: As both c˜1 and c˜2 approach to 1 in high I˜P
and MER region, the same relay will continue to be used
for data transmission in a long time. Hence, even with S-
ECSI, the SSSC protocol can substantially reduce the system
implementation complexity compared with the opportunistic
relaying protocol.
Remark 2: From the above asymptotic results of Pout, we can
find that the system diversity order falls between one and two.
In particular, the system diversity order can approach to two
for a large value of T , which can effectively exploit the two
relays to guarantee the secure transmission.
Remark 3: By comparing the minimum asymptotic Pout of
S-ECSI with that of I-ECSI, we can find that the system
performance is degraded, since the eavesdropping CSI is not
fully known in the secure switching process.
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E. Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the channel estimation
complexity of the proposed SSSC protocol. When the secure
relay switching does not occur, the system only needs to
estimate the channel parameters of a single relay, and hence
the channel estimation complexity of SSSC is just half of that
of the opportunistic relaying. On the other hand, when the
secure relay switching happens, the system needs to estimate
the channel parameters of both relays, and SSSC requires the
same channel estimation complexity as opportunistic relaying.
In summary, the channel estimation complexity of SSSC with
I-ECSI, normalized by that of opportunistic relaying, is given
by
µI = p1
[c1
2
+ (1− c1)
]
+ p2
[c2
2
+ (1− c2)
]
= 1−
1
2
c21 + c
2
2
c1 + c2
. (41)
Similarly, for SSSC with S-ECSI, its normalized channel
estimation complexity is given by
µS = 1−
1
2
c˜21 + c˜
2
2
c˜1 + c˜2
. (42)
As the stay probabilities ci and c˜i are both in the interval [0, 1]
for i = 1, 2, one can find that the normalized complexity of
SSSC falls into [0.5, 1]. Moreover, as both ci and c˜i approach 1
with high transmit power and MER, SSSC protocol can reduce
the channel estimation complexity of opportunistic relaying to
almost half.
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical and simulation results are pre-
sented to verify the proposed system. All the links in the
system experience flat Rayleigh fading. The distance between
the secondary source and destination is set to unity, and the
two relays are between in them. Let D1 and D2 denote
the distance from the secondary source to relay R1 and R2,
respectively. Accordingly, the average channel gains of the
two-hop main links are set to α1 = D−41 , α2 = D
−4
2 ,
β1 = (1 − D1)−4, and β2 = (1 − D2)−4, where the path-
loss model with loss factor of four is used. Without loss of
generality, we set the average channel gains of interference
links to unity, so that η0 = η1 = η2 = 1.The source data rate
Rd is set to 1 bps/Hz, so that the associated γ0 is equal to
3. The secrecy data rate Rs is set to 0.5 bps/Hz, so that the
secrecy SNR threshold γs is equal to 2.
Fig. 2 depicts the analytical, asymptotic and simulated SOPs
of SSSC versus MER with λ1 = λ2 = λ and I˜P = 20dB2,
where the asymptotic results are computed from eqs. (33) and
(37), respectively. The secure switching threshold T varies in
{0.5, 1, 2}T ∗ 3, where the optimal switching threshold T ∗ is
set to γs for I-ECSI, while for S-ECSI, T ∗ can be obtained
2We consider communication scenarios with I˜P = 20dB, indicating that
the primary user can tolerate a high interference level, which is widely used
in cognitive relay networks [40]–[43].
3Besides the optimal secure switching threshold, two other typical values,
0.5T ∗ and 2T ∗, are set for T to show the impact of T on the system secure
performance.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus MER.
by some numerical methods from (37) [31]–[37]. Fig. 2 (a)
and (b) correspond to the SSSC with I-ECSI and S-ECSI,
respectively. For comparison, we plot the simulated secrecy
outage probabilities of opportunistic relaying and the relay
system with only one relay as the lower and upper bounds,
respectively. As observed from Fig. 2 (a) and (b), we can
find that for both cases of I-ECSI and S-ECSI, the analytical
result of SSSC matches well with the simulation one, and
the asymptotic result converges to the exact value with high
MER more than 20dB. This verifies the validity of the derived
analytical secrecy outage probability of SSSC and asymptotic
expression. Moreover, SSSC with I-ECSI can have the same
secure performance as opportunistic relaying when T = T ∗,
and hence achieve the full diversity order. For T = 2T ∗,
SSSC of I-ECSI can also achieve the system full diversity
order of two. For T = 0.5T ∗, the curve line of SSSC with
I-ECSI is parallel with the relay system with only one relay,
indicating that the system diversity degenerates into one. On
the other hand, although SSSC with S-ECSI cannot achieve
the same performance as opportunistic relaying, the lines with
T ∈ {1, 2}T ∗ are approximately parallel with opportunistic
relaying, indicating that SSSC with S-ECSI can also approach
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus I˜P .
the system full diversity order of two in high MER region. This
can be explained from the asymptotic analysis in (37), which
contains two terms on the right hand side. Hence the diversity
of SSSC falls between one and two, causing the curve of SSSC
approximately parallel with opportunistic relaying. When the
secure switching threshold becomes very large, SSSC with S-
ECSI approaches to the system full diversity order of two,
since the exponential decreasing term of (37) converges to
zero.
Fig. 3 shows the effect of I˜P on the system secrecy outage
probability of SSSC, where the secure switching threshold
T varies in {0.5, 1, 2}T ∗, λ1 = λ2 = 30dB. Specifically,
Fig. 3 (a) and (b) correspond to the SSSC with I-ECSI and
S-ECSI, respectively. We can see from this figure that for
different values of T and I˜P , the analytical result of SSSC
is very close to the simulation one, and the asymptotic result
converges to the exact value in high I˜P region. This also
validates the derived analytical and asymptotic expressions
of SOP for SSSC with I-ECSI and S-ECSI. Moreover, SSSC
with I-ECSI and optimal secure switching threshold presents
the same performance as opportunistic relaying. In contrast,
there is a performance gap between SSSC and opportunistic
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Fig. 4. Effect of T on c1 and c˜1 versus MER.
relaying when S-ECSI is known, indicating that the secure
relaying switching is more effective with I-ECSI.
Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of T on the simulation and
analytical results of c1 and c˜1 4 of SSSC versus MER with
λ1 = λ2 = λ and I˜P = 20dB, where the secure switching
threshold T varies in {0.5, 1, 2}T ∗. Specifically, Fig. 4 (a)
and (b) correspond to the SSSC with I-ECSI and S-ECSI,
respectively. From this figure, we can find that for both I-ECSI
and S-ECSI, c1 and c˜1 increase with larger I˜P and smaller T .
In particular, c1 and c˜1 converge to unity with large value of
I˜P , indicating that the secure relay switching seldom occurs
and the system needs to estimate the channel parameters of
only one relay. In other words, the SSSC technique can reduce
the channel estimation complexity of opportunistic relaying
to almost half and meanwhile substantially reduce the relay
switching rate.
Fig. 5 demonstrates the normalized channel estimation
complexity of SSSC versus MER with λ1 = λ2 = λ and
I˜P = 20dB, where the secure switching threshold T varies in
{0.5, 1, 2}T ∗. In particular, Fig. 5 (a) and (b) correspond to
4As c2 and c˜2 show the similar behavior as c1 and c˜1, the results of c2
and c˜2 are not plotted in this figure for clarity.
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Fig. 5. Normalized channel estimation complexity of SSSC versus MER.
SSSC with I-ECSI and S-ECSI, respectively. We can observe
from Fig. 5 that for both I-ECSI and S-ECSI, the channel
estimation complexity of SSSC decreases with larger MER
or smaller switching threshold, as the secure relay switching
happens less. Moreover, SSSC can reduce the channel estima-
tion complexity of opportunistic relaying to almost half in the
high MER region, which validates the advantages of SSSC
over opportunistic relaying.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed SSSC technique for the secure cog-
nitive relay networks with two DF relays. In SSSC, one
relay out of two was chosen to be activated to assist the
data transmission from the secondary source to secondary
destination. The same relay continued to be used for data
transmission when the relay could support the secure data
transmission; otherwise the secure relay switching occurred
and the other relay would be activated. It has been shown
by the simulation and numerical results that SSSC with I-
ECSI can exploit the system full diversity, and SSSC with
S-ECSI can approach to the full diversity with large secure
relaying switching threshold. Moreover, SSSC can reduce the
channel estimation complexity of opportunistic relaying to
almost half in high MER region, and provide a stable network
configuration.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
As the variable u1
t0
is independent of t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜Pw1
, we can write
c1 from (17) as
c1 = Pr(
u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
) · Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T
)
. (A.1)
By applying the probability density functions of fu1(u1) =
1
α1
e−
u1
α1 , ft0(t0) =
1
η0
e−
t0
η0 , ft1(t1) =
1
η1
e−
t1
η1 , fv1(v1) =
1
β1
e
−
v1
β1 and fw1(w1) = 1ε1 e
−
w1
ε1 , we can compute Pr(u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
) and Pr
(
t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜Pw1
≥ T
)
as
Pr(
u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
) =
∫ ∞
0
ft0(t0)
∫ ∞
γ0
I˜P
t0
fu1(u1)du1dt0 (A.2)
= L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
), (A.3)
(A.4)
Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T
)
= Pr
(
v1 ≥
T − 1
I˜P
t1 + Tw1
)
(A.5)
=
∫ ∞
0
ft1(t1)
∫ ∞
0
fw1(w1)
∫ ∞
T−1
I˜P
t1+Tw1
fv1(v1)dv1dw1dt1
(A.6)
= L(
Tε1
β1
)L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
, (A.7)
where L(x) = (1+x)−1. By combining eqs. (A.3) and (A.7),
we can obtain the analytical expression of c1, as shown in (19)
of Proposition 1.
We now turn to derive the analytical expression of J1. As
the variable u1
t0
is independent of t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜Pw1
, we can write J1
as
J1 = Pr(
u1
t0
>
γ0
I˜P
) · Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs
)
(A.8)
= L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
) Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs
)
,
(A.9)
where we apply the result of (A.3) in the last equality. When
T ≥ γs,
t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜Pw1
≥ T contradicts with t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜Pw1
< γs, causing
that J1 = 0. On the other hand, when T < γs, we can further
write J1 as
J1 = L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)
[
Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T
)
− Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ γs
)]
(A.10)
= L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)
[
L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(
Tε1
β1
)
− L
((γs − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(
γsε1
β1
)
]
, (A.11)
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where we apply the result of (A.7) in the last equality.
We now turn to derive the analytical expression of J2 as
J2 = Pr
( t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< γs
)
× Pr
(
I˜P
u1
t0
< γ0||
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< T, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0
)
(A.12)
=
[
1− L
((γs − 1)η2
I˜Pβ2
)
L(
γsε2
β2
)
]
× Pr
(
I˜P
u1
t0
< γ0||
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< T, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J21
,
(A.13)
where the last equality is obtained by applying the result of
(A.7). We further write J21 as
J21 = Pr
(u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
− Pr
(
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T,
u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
(A.14)
= L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα2
)− Pr
(
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0
)
× Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
≥ T
)
(A.15)
= L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα2
)− Pr
(
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0
)
× L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(
Tε1
β1
), (A.16)
where we apply the results of eqs. (A.3) and (A.7) into eqs.
(A.15) and (A.16), respectively. In further, the probability of
Pr
(
I˜P
u1
t0
≥ γ0, I˜P
u2
t0
≥ γ0
)
can be computed as
Pr
(u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
,
u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
=
∫ ∞
0
ft0(t0)
∫ ∞
γ0
I˜P
t0
fu1(u1)du1
∫ ∞
γ0
I˜P
t0
fu2(u2)du2dt0
(A.17)
= L
(
(
1
α1
+
1
α2
)
γ0η0
I˜P
)
. (A.18)
By combining the above eqs. (A.13), (A.16) and (A.18), we
can arrive at the analytical expression of J2, as shown in (21)
of Proposition 1. In this way, we have completed the proof of
Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From (25), we can write c˜1 with S-ECSI as
c˜1 = Pr
(u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
· Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜PE{w1}
≥ T
)
(B.1)
= L
( γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)
Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜P ε1
≥ T
)
, (B.2)
where we apply the result of (A.3) in the last equality.
Pr
(
t1+I˜P v1
t1+I˜P ε1
≥ T
)
can be computed as
Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜P ε1
≥ T
)
= Pr
(
v1 ≥
T − 1
I˜P
t1 + Tε1
)
(B.3)
=
∫ ∞
0
ft1(t1)
∫ ∞
T−1
I˜P
t1+Tε1
fv1(v1)dv1dt1 (B.4)
= L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
e
−
ε1T
β1 , (B.5)
By combining the results of eqs. (B.2) and (B.5), we can obtain
the analytical expression of c˜1, as shown in (27) of Proposition
2.
We now turn to derive the analytical expression of J˜1 in
(22) as
J˜1 = Pr
(u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
× Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜PE{w1}
≥ T,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜Pw1
< γs
)
(B.6)
= L
( γ0η0
I˜Pα1
)
× Pr
(
v1 ≥
T − 1
I˜P
t1 + Tε1, v1 <
γs − 1
I˜P
t1 + Tw1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J˜11
,
(B.7)
where we apply the result of (A.3) in the last equality. In J˜11,
γs−1
I˜P
t1 + Tw1 needs to be larger than T−1I˜P t1 + Tε1, causing
that
γsw1 ≥
T − γs
I˜P
t1 + Tε1. (B.8)
Hence we now consider the two cases of T ≥ γs and T < γs.
If T ≥ γs, the condition of (B.8) becomes
w1 ≥
T − 1
I˜Pγs
t1 +
Tε1
γs
, (B.9)
and J˜11 is computed as
J˜11 =
∫ ∞
0
ft1(t1)
∫ ∞
T−1
I˜P γs
t1+
Tε1
γs
fw1(w1)
∫ γs−1
I˜P
t1+Tw1
T−1
I˜P
t1+Tε1
fv1(v1)dv1dw1dt1 (B.10)
= L
((T − γs)η1
I˜P ε1γs
+
(T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)(
1− L(
γsε1
β1
)
)
e−q0 ,
(B.11)
where q0 is defined in (31).
On the other hand, when T < γs holds, the condition of
(B.8) becomes
w1 +
γs − T
I˜P γs
t1 ≥
Tε1
γs
. (B.12)
This condition can be specified into two integral regions
of w1 ≥ Tε1γs and w1 <
Tε1
γs
with t1 ≥ I˜PTε1−I˜P γsw1γs−T .
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Accordingly, we can compute J˜11 as
J˜11 =
∫ ∞
0
ft1(t1)
∫ ∞
Tε1
γs
fw1(w1)
∫ γs−1
I˜P
t1+Tw1
T−1
I˜P
t1+Tε1
fv1(v1)dv1dw1dt1
+
∫ Tε1
γs
0
fw1(w1)
∫ ∞
I˜P Tε1−I˜P γsw1
γs−T
ft1(t1)
∫ γs−1
I˜P
t1+Tw1
T−1
I˜P
t1+Tε1
fv1(v1)dv1dt1dw1 (B.13)
=
[
L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
− L(
γsε1
β1
)L
((γs − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)]
e−q0
+ L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L(−q1γsε1)
(
e
−
Tε1
β1
−q1Tε1 − e−q0
)
− L
((γs − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
L
(
(
γs
β1
− q2γs)ε1
)(
e−q2Tε1 − e−q0
)
,
(B.14)
where q1 and q2 are defined in (31). By combining eqs. (B.7),
(B.11) and (B.14), we can arrive at the analytical expression
of J˜1, as shown in (28) of Proposition 2.
We now turn to derive the analytical expression of J˜2. From
(22), we can write J˜2 as
J˜2 = Pr
( t2 + I˜P v2
t2 + I˜Pw2
< γs
)
× Pr
(u1
t0
<
γ0
I˜P
||
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜P ε1
< T,
u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
(B.15)
=
[
1− L
((γs − 1)η2
I˜Pβ2
)
L(
γsε2
β2
)
]
× Pr
(u1
t0
<
γ0
I˜P
||
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜P ε1
< T,
u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J˜21
, (B.16)
where we apply the result of (A.7) in the last equality. In
further, J˜21 can be computed as
J˜21 = Pr
(u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
− Pr
(u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
,
t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜P ε1
≥ T,
u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
(B.17)
= Pr
(u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
− Pr
(u1
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
,
u2
t0
≥
γ0
I˜P
)
× Pr
( t1 + I˜P v1
t1 + I˜P ε1
≥ T
)
(B.18)
= L(
γ0η0
I˜Pα2
)− L
(
(
1
α1
+
1
α2
)
γ0η0
I˜P
)
L
((T − 1)η1
I˜Pβ1
)
e−
Tε1
β1 ,
(B.19)
where we apply the results of eqs. (A.3), (A.7) and (B.5) in
the last equality. By combining the results in eqs. (B.16) and
(B.19), we can obtain the analytical expression of J˜2 with S-
ECSI, as shown in (29) of Proposition 2. In this way, we have
completed the proof of Proposition 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We first derive the asymptotic expressions of c1 and c2. To
this end, we use the approximation of (1 + x)−1 ≃ 1− x for
small value of |x| [36, eq. (1.112)] and obtain the asymptotic
c1 and c2 as
c1 ≃ 1, c2 ≃ 1, (C.1)
which leads to p1 ≃ 0.5 and p2 ≃ 0.5. We now derive the
asymptotic expressions of J1, J2, J3 and J4. When T < γs,
we apply the approximation of (1 + x)−1 ≃ 1− x and obtain
the asymptotic expression of J1 with high I˜P and MER as
J1 ≃
γs − T
λ1
(
1 +
η1ρ1
β1
)
, (C.2)
where ρ1 is defined in (34). We further apply the approxima-
tion of (1+x)−1 ≃ 1−x into the expression of J2, and obtain
the asymptotic J2 with high I˜P and MER as
J2 ≃
ε1
λ1λ2
, (C.3)
where ε1 is defined in (34). Similarly, we can obtain the
asymptotic expressions of J3 and J3. By combining the
asymptotic results of J1, J2, J3 and J4, we can arrive at the
asymptotic SOP with high I˜P and MER, as shown in (33). In
this way, we have finished the proof of Proposition 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
By applying the approximation of (1 + x)−1 ≃ 1 − x for
small value of |x| [36, eq. (1.112)], we can approximate the
expressions of c˜1 and c˜2 with large I˜P and MER as
c˜1 ≃ 1, c˜2 ≃ 1. (D.1)
Accordingly, the asymptotic p˜1 and p˜2 are given by
p˜1 ≃
1
2
, p˜2 ≃
1
2
. (D.2)
We then extend to derive the asymptotic expressions of J˜1,
J˜2, J˜3 and J˜4 with high I˜P and high MER. By applying the
approximation of (1 + x)−1 ≃ 1 − x for small value of |x|
[36, eq. (1.112)], we can obtain the asymptotic expression of
J˜1 and J˜2 as
J˜1 ≃


γs
λ1
e−
T
γs
1
1− ε3
(
1− ε23e
− T
γs
1−ε3
ε3
)
, If T < γs
γs
λ1
e−
T
γs
1
1− ε3
, If T ≥ γs
,
(D.3)
J˜2 ≃
ε1
λ1λ2
, (D.4)
where ε3 is defined in (38). In a similar way, we can obtain
the asymptotic expressions of J˜3 and J˜4 with high I˜P and
high MER. By summarizing these asymptotic expressions, we
can arrive at the asymptotic SOP of SSSC with S-ECSI. In
this way, we have completed the proof of Proposition 4.
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